I have always been a little bewildered by the use of the bayonet. Medical statistics might show us that they were almost never used; however, these naturally suffer from survivorship bias, especially in bayonet engagements, where, as Captain Soloviev put it, there are only living victors and dead vanquished; and while we do read of counts of dead killed by the bayonet in after-action reports, this too does not show us the full picture, as we might say these single events are extreme outliers. To prove my point I think, "A Comparative study of World War casualties from gas and other weapons" (1928) puts the number of AEF casualties in the First World War caused by the bayonet at but 235; but only 4 died from their wounds. Lewis Millett's fateful charge, which killed some twenty with the bayonet, caused five times the bayonet deaths in a single day, than what we might suppose (taking those aid station statistics at face value) the US Army in WWI suffered in 19 months.
Now, regarding WWI, we do know the US was engaged in heavy hand to hand fighting during certain major engagements; notably at the Hindenburg Line; the aid station statistics above likewise are missing 75% of all AEF KIA (which is to say, some 40,000 of those 53,000 killed, did not make it to a hospital to be counted). However, I will have to cover this another day, as our focus here will be on the Korean War (1950-1953).
The two sources I will use are both surveys; one was conducted during the war, one after. These are:
G. N. Donovan, "Use of Infantry Weapons and Equipment in Korea", 1952 (which will now be referred to as "Use of Infantry Weapons") and "A Survey of Soldier Opinions about the Bayonet in the U.S. Army", 1969 (which will be referred to as "Survey of Soldier Opinions").
Now, surveys of course cannot be treated as hard fact; however, they can give us insight, especially since I have already said I think the medical statistics are at the very least, not able to be taken at face value.
"Use of Infantry Weapons", pg. 57
In the survey found in "Use of Infantry Weapons", we see the number of men who participated in an engagement where bayonets were actually used (although it does not necessarily mean they fought with the bayonet themselves):
"The bayonet in Korea was not only carried but used, according to the rifleman's own account. Of 548 men questioned, 21 percent gave the dates on which they were in actual close-in bayonet fighting. Thus 117 men were able to report the dates and location of 148 different bayonet engagements. These engagements were spread fairly evenly over the whole period from July 1950 thru October 1951, and every division was represented to about the same extent."
Of that 21% (117/548), 16% (19/117) participated in more than one bayonet action (or around 3% of the whole). So first of the bat, we see two things: around 1 out of 5 respondents participated in a bayonet action, but only 3% participated in more than one. Which is to say, it was both not actually rare for someone to have seen the bayonet used, but it was rare to see it more than once. But how much combat does a soldier see? How many major engagements does he take part of?
Now this itself is not a very useful figure, but the post-war survey ("Survey of Soldier Opinions") gives a very similar figure:
"Survey of Soldier Opinions", pg. 21
Focusing on Korea, there were 124 respondents; 58% said none or almost none of individuals in their units engaged an enemy with the bayonet, with 19% saying less than 5%, 12% saying 10%, 6% saying 25%, and 5% saying 50% or more. For men who said 10% or more men in their units engaged an enemy with the bayonet, we come to 23%, which is very close to our 21% figure above. Considering 5% of a platoon is essentially 1 man, and of a company only but a handful, I do not consider these to be really significant.
Let us compare to the survey's result on the use of knives (again, from the same source):
"Survey of Soldier Opinions", pg. 10
Out of 126 respondents, 66% said a knife (in hand) was involved in no or almost no actions. 22% said less than 5% of actions involved its use in hand-to-hand combat, 10% for 10% of actions, 2% for 25% of actions, and under 1% for 50% or more. So around 12% partook in a significant amount of actions where any amount of hand-to-hand combat with a knife (or a bayonet off the rifle) took place.
So I think we can say the use of the bayonet was not actually that rare. "Lessen van de Koreaanse oorlog", 1952, regarding the Dutch UN troops, seems to confirm this:
"Much attention should be paid to geweervechten [rifle fighting; ie, bayonet drill], for hand-to-hand combat [handgemeen] is very common in Korea and has proven to be very active."
Some might say that this was due to Chinese infiltration tactics, however, the "Survey of Soldier Opinions" gives us data for which were during offensive actions, and which were during defensive ones:
"Survey of Soldier Opinions", pg. 21
Out of a total of 89, 48% rated offense as the situation where the bayonet was most frequently used, and 27% rated both defense situations as the situation where the bayonet was most frequently used. Interestingly, only 25% rated those "Special Operations" as where the bayonet was used the most; I suspect minor actions (raids, patrols, etc.) to generally consist of a small minority of where bayonet engagements took place. On the other hand, Eugene Sledge, regarding Peleliu in WWII (which was obviously a different war), said in an interview that:
"The Japanese had what was called 'infiltration' down to a fine art, and they laid up in the caves, deep in the caves all night. So while we were attacking the caves all day, they were in a safe place getting rest. I think every man in my unit, except Snafu and I, at one time or another, was involved in hand-to-hand combat. And that's the most Godawful, primitive sounding thing, it was almost like, I thought often that's the way [the] neanderthal man must've been."
"Use of Infantry Weapons" shows that bayonet actions seem mostly to occur during certain times; the lack of a mostly even spread to me points towards bayonet actions mostly occurring during major engagements.
"Use of Infantry Weapons", pg. 57
However, while we might say on average 1 out of 5 men partook in a bayonet action, we have additional data that will clarify something:
"Survey of Soldier Opinions", pg. 20
While the bayonet was generally carried by the vast majority of respondents in Korea, we see a stark difference for how many "frequently" affixed their bayonets to their rifles in combat. Out of the 124 respondents, 61% only fixed their bayonets in 10% or less of all actions. 19% fixed them 25% of the time, 10% fixed them 50% of the time, 6% for 75% of the time, and 2% for 90% or more. We can further see a correlation between how often the bayonet is fixed and how many men in a unit have engaged an enemy with the bayonet.
So for men who fixed their bayonets for 25% of actions or more, we come to 39%. However, since fixing the bayonet was usually by command, it is likely that this is reflective of the units. Indeed, there is evidence that a want to use the bayonet is highly dependent on the unit involved (I would not say willingness, since these men likewise came to close proximity to their foes, but just shot them instead, or used their grenades), but I will have to cover that another time; so for now, please take my word for it.
"Use of Infantry Weapons" likewise shows certain units engage a lot more than others.
Now we come to the thought experiment of this article. This following section is only to show that I think we cannot simply write off the use of the bayonet, as there is sufficient evidence to at least question that presumption; which is to say, do not take this as gospel.
For the percentage of men (see question 12 above) who actually engaged with the enemy, we come to a possible 1.2%, 1.5%, and 2.5%, for 10%, 25%, and 50%, respectively; which again comes to a possible total of 5.2%. If we assume that the "less than 5%" is on average 2%, then we come to an additional 0.4%, for a new total of 5.6%. Which is to say, it is possible around 5.6% men engaged with an enemy in hand-to-hand combat with the bayonet. In my opinion, this would likely be reflecting mostly kill or be killed situations, as if they actually engaged with an enemy, they or their immediate enemy likely would not be surrendering at that moment. So possibly about 1/4 of men who partook in a bayonet action actually killed a man with the bayonet.
Now we come to some really rough math, and not something to be taken too seriously: let us attempt to calculate the number of North Korean and Chinese killed by the bayonet. Let us first assume that the combat units of both the entire US Army and US Marine Corps followed these figures.
1,153,000 US soldiers and 130,000 US marines were deployed to Korea proper, for a total of 1,283,000. The T3R for the US Army was 42% combat personnel in Korea proper (which is to say, not including those deployed in Japan), and let us assume the same is for the Marines, which comes to 538,860 as the number of combat troops.
23% of that comes to around 123,938; this is the possible number who partook in a bayonet action.
5.6% of the total comes to around 30,176; this is the possible number who actually engaged an enemy with the bayonet. Let us further assume this is the number of killed enemy combatants (Chinese and North Korean soldiers).
Now the combat casualties of the Chinese and North Koreans is a little contradictory and hard to figure out: the best I can figure out is 336,000 for the number of Chinese KIA and WIA combined. Assuming a similar WIA to KIA ratio of 2:1 for the North Koreans, we come to around 400,000, which comes to a combined total of 736,000 combat casualties.
Our possible percentage of killed by the bayonet is heavily dependent on this, so again, do not take this as gospel, as these figures are incredibly rough. Assuming this to be correct anyhow, we come to a possible 4.1% percentage of killed by the bayonet. Even assuming the combat casualties were 1 million, we still come to 3%.
This looks very small, but let us put this in perspective. If 50% of PVA and KPA casualties were from artillery, mines, etc. (which I think is a fair estimate), and the other 50% were by bullets, hand grenades, etc. (that is to say, the arms of the individual) (368,000-500,000 PVA-KPA combat casualties), then perhaps bayonets accounted for anywhere between 6-8.2% of casualties caused by these small arms.
Now this is already a sizeable number, but one must remember that American forces only consisted of around half of all allied ground forces in Korea. So if a generous 75% of this hypothetical 50% (the figure for communist casualties from small arms) were from US forces (276,000-375,000 small arms casualties), then we come to a possible 8-11% of PVA-KPA casualties caused by US small arms being from bayonets.
Which is to say, bayonets could have caused possibly anywhere from 2 in 25 to a little over 1 in 10 PVA-KPA casualties caused by American small arms. But this goes further; as previously stated, only around 39% (let us round up to 40%) of American units likely affixed their bayonets with any frequency. So it likely wouldn't actually be 1/10 enemy casualties were caused by bayonets in any given unit, but perhaps on average, none or almost none in 60% of units, and 4/25 to around 1/5 in the other 40% of units.
Now of course, you might find these numbers a little ridiculous, which I think is fair, they do seem a little high. I have not accounted for combat personnel who were not infantrymen, the PVA-KPA casualties are not researched very well, and there are numerous leaps in logic. On the other hand, I was quite generous with the casualties caused by American small arms (ignoring the UN forces and especially the ROK), and if artillery etc. caused more casualties than 50% (which I personally doubt; 50% feels right to me) then naturally bayonets would take a larger piece of the pie.
But I personally think 1/10 in a unit that prefers to press home with the bayonet feels right (and not entirely unfounded, as Captain Soloviev in the Russo-Japanese War felt that the number of casualties from the bayonet were on par with artillery). And after all, we know soldiers could come quite close to their enemies before shooting, so in my opinion, it is not a great leap of the imagination to say they might thrust instead (and in my opinion, tactically it doesn't really matter which one they do, even if the one or the other may be more sure in certain circumstances).
Either way, I think I have displayed that we probably should not be so cut and dry with bayonets; that we may admit they only caused a fraction of the casualties, but possibly a significant one; that surely in some units bayonet kills were unseen, but in others they might be not nearly so. I do not think we can, nor should, attempt to simply apply these numbers to other wars (and as said, to all units), seeing as battle and war is quite random (and if even one side does not agree to fight hand to hand, neither will probably be involved in that manner of fight very often), but I think we should at least think a little harder on the truism that bayonets never met.
- William
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