Omdurman and the Knightly Charge

The Battle of Omdurman is particularly famed for a cavalry charge recorded by Winston Churchill (who was an officer who partook in the said charge). I have seen Churchill's recollection referred to frequently, yet only recently did I sit down to read it. It is quite enlightening, and confirms many of my suspicions. It is quite a famous account, and many of my conclusions are not at all hard to get to, but committing things to writing is good to form one's argument and knowledge, and I have seen opinions espoused that are contradicted by this account, so I will analyze it regardless, specifically to the end of understanding the Medieval and Early Modern cavalry charge better. You may read the full account of the battle here.

"This detachment was composed entirely of the Hadendoa tribesmen of Osman Digna's flag, and was commanded by one of his subordinate Emirs, who selected a suitable position in the shallow khor. As soon as the 21st Lancers left the zeriba the Dervish scouts on the top of Surgham carried the news to the Khalifa. It was said that the English cavalry were coming to cut him off from Omdurman. Abdullahi thereupon determined to strengthen his extreme right; and he immediately ordered four regiments, each 600 strong, drawn from the force around the Black Flag and under the Emir Ibrahim Khalil, to reinforce the Hadendoa in the khor. While we were waiting for orders on the ridge these men were hurrying southwards along the depression, concealed by a spur of Surgham Hill. The lancer patrol reconnoitered the khor, at the imminent risk of their lives, while it was only occupied by the original 700 Hadendoa. Galloping back, they reported that it was held by about 1,000 men. Before they rejoined the regiment this number was increased to 2,700. This, however, we had no means of knowing. 

[...] 

Thereupon and with one accord the blue-clad men dropped on their knees, and there burst out a loud, crackling fire of musketry. It was hardly possible to miss such a target at such a range. Horses and men fell at once. The only course was plain and welcome to all. The Colonel, nearer than his regiment, already saw what lay behind the skirmishers. He ordered "Right wheel into line" to be sounded. The trumpet jerked out a shrill note, heard faintly above the trampling of the horses and the noise of the rides. On the instant all the sixteen troops swung round and locked up into a long galloping line, and the 21st Lancers were committed to their first charge in war."

Here we have the backdrop. 2,700 Mahdists facing less than 400 British lancers (this number can be seen at the end).

"Two hundred and fifty yards away the dark-blue men were firing madly in a thin film of light-blue smoke. Their bullets struck the hard gravel into the air, and the troopers, to shield their faces from the stinging dust, bowed their helmets forward, like the Cuirassiers at Waterloo. The pace was fast and the distance short. Yet, before it was half covered, the whole aspect of the affair changed. A deep crease in the ground---a dry watercourse, a khor---appeared where all had seemed smooth, level plain; and from it there sprang, with the suddenness of a pantomime effect and a high-pitched yell, a dense white mass of men nearly as long as our front and about twelve deep. A score of horsemen and a dozen bright flags rose as if by magic from the earth. Eager warriors sprang forward to anticipate the shock. The rest stood firm to meet it. The Lancers acknowledged the apparition only by an increase of pace. Each man wanted sufficient momentum to drive through such a solid line. The flank troops, seeing that they overlapped, curved inwards like the horns of a moon. But the whole event was a matter of seconds. The riflemen, firing bravely to the last, were swept head over heels into the khor, and jumping down with them, at full gallop and in the closest order, the British squadrons struck the fierce brigade with one loud furious shout. The collision was prodigious. Nearly thirty Lancers, men and horses, and at least two hundred Arabs were overthrown. The shock was stunning to both sides, and for perhaps ten wonderful seconds no man heeded his enemy. Terrified horses wedged in the crowd; bruised and shaken men, sprawling in heaps, struggled, dazed and stupid, to their feet, panted, and looked about them. Several fallen Lancers had even time to remount."

Thus we see two things; an explicit mention of shock, with horses crashing into people, horsemen being dismounted and footmen being knocked down; and horses charging into a strong, and especially stalwart (as you will soon see), group of infantry, ranked 12 men deep.

"Meanwhile the impetus of the cavalry carried them on. As a rider tears through a bullfinch, the officers forced their way through the press; and as an iron rake might be drawn through a heap of shingle, so the regiment followed. They shattered the Dervish array, and, their pace reduced to a walk, scrambled out of the khor on the further side, leaving a score of troopers behind them, and dragging on with the charge more than a thousand Arabs. Then, and not till then, the killing began; and thereafter each man saw the world along his lance, under his [sword] guard, or through the back-sight of his pistol; and each had his own strange tale to tell. 

Stubborn and unshaken infantry hardly ever meet stubborn and unshaken cavalry. Either the infantry run away and are cut down in flight, or they keep their heads and destroy nearly all the horsemen by their musketry. On this occasion two living walls had actually crashed together. The Dervishes fought manfully. They tried to hamstring the horses. They fired their rifles, pressing the muzzles into the very bodies of their opponents. They cut reins and stirrup-leathers. They flung their throwing-spears with great dexterity. They tried every device of cool, determined men practiced in war and familiar with cavalry; and, besides, they swung sharp, heavy swords which bit deep. The hand-to-hand fighting on the further side of the khor lasted for perhaps one minute. Then the horses got into their stride again, the pace increased, and the Lancers drew out from among their antagonists. Within two minutes of the collision every living man was clear of the Dervish mass. All who had fallen were cut at with swords till they stopped quivering, but no artistic mutilations were attempted. The enemy's behavior gave small ground for complaint."

Clearly the reference to "Stubborn and unshaken infantry hardly ever meet stubborn and unshaken cavalry" is only for his day, as we read of such things frequently in the Medieval period, and sometimes in the 18th and the earlier half of the 19th century.

And again, we see notable things. Cavalry literally breaking through infantry, horses being slowed down to a walk after the clash, and "the killing" being in the melee.

The horses being slowed to a walk explains Pietro Monte's advice regarding fighting with impetus:

"Sometimes it is useful to act against enemies with great impetus. But this is in group combat, particularly when we begin to put them to flight. At such times it is better to deliver as many blows as we can. But for this we should be well armored, and have some companions, so that if the enemies avoid one of our blows they cannot harm us. And we should rarely use this fury except in necessity, for example to make our way out from some tight spot or to take some place or essential route. In general I recommend temperance."

(The Escorial manuscript has "when we are beginning to withdraw" instead of "when we begin to put them to flight") Perhaps this is why maces, axes, hammers, flails, and heavy swords were popular amongst horsemen; a heavy weapon to swing repeatedly once you are in the midst of an enemy could clearly be helpful.

This is very tangential but somewhat relevant to striking in the melee against men on foot:

"The cut from high to low [fendente] can rarely deliver a great blow to someone else on horseback. With men on foot or game animals, whom you can strike this way, you should never pull with the sword, which will make it cut less, and easily strike your foot or horse, but bear downwards on the blow with all your body, squeezing the sword well in your hand; this way you will deliver a much greater blow, other things being equal with the sword and the thing you are striking."

- Duarte I

As for horsemen charging straight through, such a thing is so deemed so important to Jean de Bueil, that he states multiple times that if there is no path beyond, the cavalry charge will fail.

"And here’s another lesson: combatants on horseback shouldn't launch a charge on an enemy unless they can see a safe exit beyond – and this is a lesson many have learnt to their cost: many a charge has been launched by a large force on smaller numbers, only to find that when the leaders are driven back, the remainder fail to make progress."

- Jean de Bueil

"It is the job of the cavalry to charge the enemy at full speed – provided that the terrain allows the charge to follow through: trying to turn a charge around will lead to defeat, which is why I do not recommend it, unless of course a turn is a deliberate tactic to get out of an unfavourable position. But it is essential to leave the enemy, whether on foot or on horseback, a space through which they can flee."

- Idem

"The enemy’s mounted men-at-arms couldn’t ride at the bowmen because they couldn’t pass through the barricade – and if mounted men try to charge men on foot and have no exit for the charge, they’re stymied."

- Idem

Now back to Omdurman:

"Two hundred yards away the regiment halted, rallied, faced about, and in less than five minutes were re-formed and ready for a second charge. The men were anxious to cut their way back through their enemies. We were alone together---the cavalry regiment and the Dervish brigade. The ridge hung like a curtain between us and the army. The general battle was forgotten, as it was unseen. This was a private quarrel. The other might have been a massacre; but here the fight was fair, for we too fought with sword and spear. Indeed, the advantage of ground and numbers lay with them. All prepared to settle the debate at once and for ever. But some realization of the cost of our wild ride began to come to those who were responsible. Riderless horses galloped across the plain. Men, clinging to their saddles, lurched helplessly about, covered with blood from perhaps a dozen wounds. Horses, streaming from tremendous gashes, limped and staggered with their riders. In 120 seconds five officers, 66 men, and 119 horses out of less than 400 had been killed or wounded. The Dervish line, broken by the charge, began to re-form at once. They closed up, shook themselves together, and prepared with constancy and courage for another shock. But on military considerations it was desirable to turn them out of the khor first and thus deprive them of their vantage-ground. The regiment again drawn up, three squadrons in line and the fourth in column, now wheeled to the right, and, galloping round the Dervish flank, dismounted and opened a heavy fire with their magazine carbines. Under the pressure of this fire the enemy changed front to meet the new attack, so that both sides were formed at right angles to their original lines. When the Dervish change of front was completed, they began to advance against the dismounted men. But the fire was accurate, and there can be little doubt that the moral effect of the charge had been very great, and that this brave enemy was no longer unshaken. Be this as it may, the fact remains that they retreated swiftly, though in good order, towards the ridge of Surgham Hill, where the Khalifa's Black Flag still waved, and the 21st Lancers remained in possession of the ground---and of their dead."

So stalwart were these Mahdists, that even after they are charged straight through, they reform to meet the lancers; even advancing towards them when they see the British alight from their mounts. And after the great clash that overthrew so many, they kept fought until the British broke through the other side. And so disciplined, that even when they are forced to retreat, they do so in a good manner after everything that occurred to them. Clearly they did not fail to stop the charge from a lack of courage or discipline. Perhaps another charge from the lancers would have put them to rout. Perhaps they would have resisted and killed all the lancers.

Thus no excuse for the Mahdists can be given, such as that the Mahdists must have been shaken or already disordered, to be made; they did most things right and were still broken through. They were disciplined and courageous, and the horses still knocked them down. Machiavelli's and many modern academics and pop historian's claims that neither horses nor horsemen will charge such a thing have therefore been disproven.

"For the spur makes it go ahead, and, on the other side, either the sword or the pike keep it back, such that a maniple of infantrymen is seen through ancient and through modern experiences to be very secure, indeed insuperable, against cavalrymen. And if against this you argue that the impetus with which it comes makes it more furious in charging whoever wants to withstand it, and makes it esteem the pike less than the spur, I say that if the horse begins to see from afar that it has to hit the points of the pikes, either it checks its course on its own, so that as it feels itself pricked it will stop entirely, or as it approaches them it will turn to the right or left. If you want to make an experiment of this, try to run a horse into a wall with whatever impetus you want: rarely will you find that it goes into it."

- Niccolò Machiavelli

"Notwithstanding that Nicholas Machiauel haue set foorth his whole knowledge, as touching fortification, and other sundry policies, the which if he had béen a soldier he would neuer haue done. As in his booke called the Art of war is to be séene. 

It is a sport to heare how he doth by himselfe, fight a battell in words, and saith, that if he had béen a soldier in his youth, he would either haue woon the field with valor, or at the least haue lost it without shame. Who did let [archaic; read as prevent] him to become a soldier in his youth?"

- Humfrey Barwick

Even the idea that horses will not wish to impale themselves can be disproven by the many accounts of horses impaling themselves onto spears, swords, and bayonets. No; when the horseman does not charge a body of infantry but rather turns away, it is the choice of his own, not of his horse (provided at the very least his horse is trained for such a thing, although I have heard of horses sometimes impaling themselves upon trees and fences; the herd mentality may also strengthen their resolve).

"On that day, many infantrymen marched out from Shayzar, too. The Franks attacked them but were unable to make them budge from their position. So Tancred flew into a rage and said, 'You are my knights! Each one of you earns a stipend worth a hundred stipends of these Muslims. These are but sarjand [ie, serjeants] (which means infantrymen), and you cannot even dislodge them from their place!' 

They replied, 'But we were only afraid for our horses; otherwise we would have run them down and put our spears through them.' 

At this, Tancred said, 'The horses are mine. Whoever loses his charger in battle, let me replace it.' They then made a number of charges against our men, in which seventy of their horses were killed, but they still were unable to shake our men from their positions."

- Usama ibn Munqidh

In Le Jouvencel, Jouvencel charges into a group of soldiers, and after the charge breaks them in half, he turned onto the "more disciplined half" (perhaps because the other half would not attempt to aid the other half). Note that he orders his horsemen to follow him; this is likely how the rest of the horsemen knew which half to charge. The author does not seem to describe an in depth formation for the cavalry, besides the squadrons or echelons being tight together. Perhaps they were charging in wedge, and were to simply follow him by the sight of him. Or perhaps a banner rode next or behind him, and they were to follow that.

"We regroup, form ranks, and make a disciplined charge. Put your lances in the vanguard, the archers behind, and let me go a little in front to reconnoitre. When I give the sign, follow right behind me. Watch me, and where I charge into the enemy ranks, follow my lead and stay close. As I go ahead, I’ll need you to give me cover, and when we engage them pell-mell, aim for their armpits and their throats and anywhere there are weaknesses in their armour. 

[...] 

So Jouvencel rode out ahead, well under control so he could assess the enemies’ dispositions; they were more or less in the state he’d described, although they’d tried to reinstil discipline now that they’d seen Jouvencel and his men, and to reimpose battle order – although they were still so weighed down by their booty that they were still in a state of confusion. Jouvencel charged into them, followed so closely by all his men that the enemy ranks were broken and split in half. Jouvencel and his men turned on the more disciplined half and mowed them down – and once that half was in disarray, the other half took fright and fled."

- Jean de Bueil

According to Guillaume Trigant (a former servant of the author), most of what de Bueil wrote occurred at some place, by someone (even if not done by or to de Bueil proper). However, even if this account is not a semi-fictional recollection of an actual charge, it is prescribed advice.

So why didn't the British lancers immediately turn and attack the weakened infantry, who were probably split in two? Perhaps it was due to inexperience of charging infantry. Perhaps it was due to a lack arming. 20-30 of them had been killed, another 40-30 had been wounded, along with a fourth of their horses wounded or killed as well, all in two minutes (as he said). Europeans by this point were not best equipped for protracted melees, and even cuirassiers left their limbs exposed. If they had been in full armor, while they still would have taken losses, especially those unhorsed, perhaps the number of wounded would not have been so great in the same time span or the same distance crossed. If their horses were stronger, perhaps they would have been able to keep up a stronger pace whilst in their midst, and not just a walk. While likewise the men on foot below them would likely have taken fewer losses if they were better armed, they are still exposed to the horseman, who can give powerful blows by nature of his height and his horse.

To conclude, I would like to nuance this, lest I create more myths. As seen above by ibn Munqidh (and many other accounts and treatises), sometimes cavalry puts the spurs to their horses and still fail to break the infantry. Sometimes infantry stand fast and fail to stop the cavalry, as seen by this account (and also many others; see the many battles where cavalry broke footmen (even pikemen, or fusiliers in square) who by all means stood firm; there is no reason to automatically assume charges that have not been described in such depth, like the one at Dyrrhachium with the Normans, only succeeded because the infantry failed in their duties; it would be ridiculous to assume every failed cavalry charge only failed because the horsemen did not stay to the assault). War, battle, and combat is fickle by nature; you can do everything right and sometimes still fail. There are surely advantages and factors that can lead to victory and defeat; hence charging where they are weakest is often prescribed, one would be a fool to not utilize an advantage (mobility in this case) when able (emphasis). But again, sometimes you are just given a bad hand; or sometimes a great hand against all odds. Maybe that is why so many treatises give the victory of combat and the cavalry charge to the will of God or the heavens.

"equus paratur ad diem belli Dominus autem salutem tribuet"

This one was a bit different, but I hope you enjoyed my ramblings! And I do implore you to read the full account, at least of the charge, it has some other neat things.

- William